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ABSTRACT
In 2013, Vivid Entertainment, a leader in the adult film industry,
sought to invalidate Los Angeles County’s Safer Sex in the Adult
Film Industry Act, a local ordinance that requires pornography
actors to use condoms while producing sex scenes. Vivid’s claim
failed when the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
deemed the law constitutional because, though content-based,
the law targeted the secondary effects of speech—transmission of
sexually transmitted diseases among actors and the public.
This case is the most recent in a line of secondary effects doctrine
cases that targets a particular type of speech because of its alleged
secondary health effects. Sexually Oriented Businesses (SOBs),
like the pornography industry, are often the target of this type of,
supposedly, content-neutral form of regulation. However, such
regulation requires evidence to prove that local and state
governments intend to place mere time, place, and manner
restrictions on SOBs for the benefit of the public. This study
argues that the evidence local and state governments typically
use to support their claims against these SOBs tend to be both
broad and unsubstantiated in their support of public health, thus
creating an imbalance between the protection of speech and the
protection of health. The conclusions drawn from this analysis
provide recommendations on how to improve the secondary
effects doctrine to restore balance between protecting speech and
protecting health.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In November 2012, the citizens of Los Angeles County,
California, passed the Safer Sex in the Adult Film Industry Act. 1
This local ordinance, commonly known as “Measure B,” set new
requirements for adult films produced within the county. 2 The
law requires that persons who act in pornographic films wear
condoms while producing sex scenes. 3 Proponents of the law,
such as the AIDS Healthcare Foundation, advocated for
condom usage in the adult film industry to protect actors—and,
in turn, the public—from sexually transmitted diseases. 4 Though
the law champions public health interests on its face, it was
highly contested by members of the adult film industry and by
free expression advocates. 5
Opponents of the law argued the requirements infringed
on the First Amendment rights of speech and expression of
actors and filmmakers in the industry. Moreover, members of the
adult film industry argued that the requirements imposed by the
law would lead to changes in their production and income. This
would force film production out of Los Angeles County and
result in massive loss of tax income for the area. 6 When the law
passed, leaders of the adult film industry challenged the law on
constitutional grounds, 7 but the challenge ultimately failed, and
the law remains active in Los Angeles County. 8
At its core, Measure B is internally conflicted between the
protection of speech and the protection of health. Measure B
1

L.A. CTY. CODE, CAL., tit. 11, div. 1, ch. 39, (Nov. 6, 2012) [hereinafter Measure B].
Id.
3
Id. § 090 (“The use of condoms is required for all acts of anal or vaginal sex during
the production of adult films to protect performers from sexually transmitted
disease.”).
4
Los Angeles Porn Actors Required to Wear Condoms Act, Measure B, BALLOTPEDIA,
https://ballotpedia.org/Los_Angeles_Porn_Actors_Required_to_Wear_Condoms_
Act,_Measure_B_(November_2012) (last visited Mar. 1, 2019).
5
Actors and representatives of the adult film industry, such as the Freedom of
Speech Coalition (FSC), spoke out against the condom mandate. For example, in
response to the decision by the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals to uphold the mandate,
the CEO of the FSC, Diane Duke, stated “While this intermediate decision allows
that condoms may be mandated, it doesn’t mean they should be. We have spent the
last two years fighting for the rights of adult performers to make their own decisions
about their bodies, and against the stigma against adult film performers embodied in
the statute. Rather than protect adult performers, a condom mandate pushes a legal
industry underground where workers are less safe. This is terrible policy that has
been defeated in other legislative venues.” FSC: 'Measure B Decision Will Hurt
Performers', AVN, https://avn.com/business/articles/legal/fsc-measure-b-decisionwill-hurt-performers-582729.html (Dec. 15, 2014).
6
Los Angeles Porn Actors Required to Wear Condoms Act, Measure B, supra note 4.
7
Vivid Entm’t, LLC v. Fielding, 965 F. Supp. 2d 1121–22 (2013).
8
Vivid Entm’t, LLC v. Fielding, 774 F.3d 566 (9th Cir. 2014) (dismissing Vivid
Entertainment’s argument that the law was an unconditional infringement on
pornography actors’ and film producers’ First Amendment rights to freedom of
speech and expression).
2

2019]

IMBALANCE BETWEEN SPEECH & HEALTH

215

sacrifices a degree of protection for a form of speech and
expression to increase protections for public health. This type of
public health regulation on speech is common: In 1938, Congress
passed the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, requiring
warning labels on food and drugs, 9 and in 1970 broadcast
advertisements for cigarettes were banned as a means of
discouraging the use of tobacco. 10
Despite the general similarities, Measure B differs from
previous public health regulations of this nature. Previous
regulations compel and control messages, but Measure B
controls how speech is made. It eliminates personal rights of the
actors to choose how they protect themselves from sexually
transmitted diseases (STDs), and it dictates how filmmakers
must produce their films. Measure B is content-based on its face
due to its focus on a specific type of expression (condom usage
in adult films). However, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit deemed Measure B’s mandated condom use provision as
content-neutral because the law is aimed at the secondary effects of
speech at issue rather than controlling speech. 11 Regulations of
this nature are not unique: secondary effect-based regulations are
common for sexually oriented businesses (“SOBs”), such as
adult bookstores 12 or nude dancing clubs. 13 Typically, these
regulations deal with zoning and crime prevention, based on the
argument that the presence of SOBs will lead to a rise in crime in
surrounding areas. In contrast, Measure B’s primary objective is
to protect health.
Measure B is, thus, unique to the law and the legal
literature. While there is a vast body of literature on secondary
effect regulations, little of it addresses secondary effect
regulations that are driven by public health concerns.
9

Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, Pub. L. No. 75–717, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938).
Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91–222, 84 Stat. 87
(1970).
11
Vivid Entm’t, 965 F. Supp. 2d at 1125. “Secondary effects” refer to adverse
side effects of certain forms of speech or expression. In some cases, the
Secondary Effects Doctrine is employed by law-makers as a means of
regulating specific types of speech under a content-neutral guise. See Young v.
Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 87 (1976). Secondary effects have been
the subject of debate ever since: in Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., Justice Souter
was the voice for morality when the Court determined the constitutionality of
an ordinance prohibiting nudity. Souter agreed with the majority that the law
was content neutral, but differed from the majority in that he felt the law was
content-related—just not to the extent that the law was unjustified. Rather,
Souter considered nude dancing akin to prostitution and sexual violence,
deeming them the “secondary effect” of the nude dancing. See Barnes v. Glen
Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 585–86 (1991) (Souter, J., concurring).
12
See Young v. Am. Mini Theaters, Inc. 427 U.S. 50, 55 (1976) (showing that as
early as the 1970s, zoning restrictions on SOBs were implemented for the purposes of
protecting property value and reducing crime).
13
Id.
10
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Specifically, there is little information about the arguments
supporting public health-driven regulations of this nature or their
substantiating evidence. As a result, it is unknown what impact,
or potential threat, these types of arguments and lack of evidence
pose to SOBs and the freedom of speech, generally. 14 This is
problematic, as public health-driven regulations are on the rise
for SOBs. For example, since 2016, five states have declared
pornography a “public health crisis” and passed resolutions
calling for research on and regulation of adult entertainment. 15
Thus, as these regulations continue to emerge, information and
scholarly recommendations on these types of regulations are
needed.
This study analyzes cases where SOBs challenged public
health-driven secondary effect regulations. Specifically, the
analysis identifies the health claims against SOBs and the
substantiating evidence used to support such claims. These
findings were compiled to draw conclusions about the balance
between protecting health and protecting speech.
Part II of this Article provides the history and
development of the secondary effects doctrine. Part III is a
discussion on the related legal research. Part IV details the
study’s methodology. Part V contains the case analysis,
including the identification of the health claims and their
substantiating evidence within the cases, and a discussion on
what this information suggests about the balance between speech
and health.
II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE SECONDARY EFFECTS DOCTRINE
The Secondary Effects Doctrine deems facially contentbased restrictions content-neutral because the objective of these
regulations is not to control speech, but to control the related or
resulting conduct that stems from the targeted speech. 16 For the
Secondary Effects Doctrine to apply, a regulation cannot directly
suppress the message of the speech, only the “secondary effects”
14

Regulations may target concerns for public health and safety together, but this
study is only concerned about the secondary effect regulations that target public
health as these are potentially an impermissible basis for restriction.
15
The five states are Arkansas (H.R. 1402, 91st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark.
2017)), South Dakota (S.C.R. 4, 92nd S., Reg. Sess. (S.D. 2017)), Tennessee (S.J.R.
35, 110th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2017)), Virginia (H.J. Res. 549, 2017
Gen. Assemb. (Va. 2017)), Utah (S.C.R. 9, 2016 Gen. Sess. (Utah 2016)). See also
Here Are the States That Have Passed Resolutions Declaring Porn a Public Health Issue,
FIGHT THE NEW DRUG (Nov. 28, 2017), https://fightthenewdrug.org/here-are-thestates-that-have-passed-resolutions/ (last visited Oct. 13, 2018). These 11 U.S. States
Passed Resolutions Declaring Porn a Public Health Issue, FIGHT THE NEW DRUG (Dec. 13,
2018), https://fightthenewdrug.org/here-are-the-states-that-have-passedresolutions/.
16
City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 49 (1986).
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associated with the speech; must serve a substantial government
interest; and cannot limit access to the speech. 17 To demonstrate
a substantial interest, the government must provide evidence that
shows the SOB causes—or is associated with—the asserted
secondary effects, and that the proposed regulation is a
reasonable measure that will reduce those particular effects. 18 If
the presence of secondary effects and the efficiency of a
regulation has been proven to effectively target the specific
conduct that a local or state government seeks to address, it may
simply cite the findings of research conducted by other districts
to satisfy this requirement. 19
This doctrine was first discussed by the United States
Supreme Court in Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc. 20 In
Young, the City of Detroit implemented two zoning ordinances
that prohibited adult theaters from opening within certain
distances of residential districts and city buildings. 21 The city
claimed the ordinances were enacted in the name of
neighborhood preservation. 22 A chain of local adult film theaters,
American Mini Theatres, contested the ordinances as unlawful,
arguing that they infringed upon the company’s First
Amendment rights. 23 The Court determined that the erotic
material in question could not be completely suppressed but
deemed the ordinances constitutional because they did not
directly suppress the message of the speech, only the secondary
effects associated with the speech. 24 Moreover, the Court found
that the ordinances served a substantial government interest and
did not limit access to the speech. 25 The Court ruled that sexual
expression may be regulated and, further, that subsequent
regulations attempting to minimize the secondary outcomes

17

Id.
Annex Books, Inc. v. City of Indianapolis, 581 F.3d 460, 462 (7th Cir. 2009)
(citing City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, 535 U.S. 425, 435 (2002)). The
plurality opinion in Alameda Books reasserted the Renton standard, where a
municipality may rely on any evidence that is “reasonably believed to be relevant”
for demonstrating a connection between speech and a substantial, independent
government interest. Id.
19
Playtime Theatres, 475 U.S. at 51–52.
20
427 U.S. 50, 71 n.34 (1976).
21
The ordinances specified that “an adult theater may not be located within 1,000
feet of any two other ‘regulated uses’ or within 500 feet of a residential area.” Id. at
52. The term “regulated uses” includes ten different kinds of establishments in
addition to adult theaters, including adult bookstores, cabarets, bars, taxi dance halls,
and hotels. Id. at 52 n.3.
22
Id. at 54.
23
Id. at 55.
24
Id. at 70.
25
Id. at 71–73.
18
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from sexual speech would be subject to the Secondary Effects
Doctrine. 26
Over the next decade, similar zoning regulations against
SOBs continued. The next major challenge came in 1986 in the
case of City of Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc. 27 In Renton, the
Court ruled on the constitutionality of a city zoning ordinance
that regulated adult movie theater locations in the name of
curbing the secondary effects associated with the adult film
industry. 28 Like in Young, the Court ruled in favor of the city.
This time, however, the Court provided crucial reasoning that
explained a facially content-based regulation on speech can be
assessed as content-neutral where the speech restriction is
“justified without reference to the content of the regulated
speech,” 29 so long as the ordinance in question does not
“contravene the fundamental principle” that government may
not limit speech based on content or message it finds
unfavorable. 30 In addition, the Renton Court stated the
government need not substantiate its interest with evidence or
research specific to the geography and adult business for which
the ordinance(s) applies, noting:
[T]he First Amendment does not
require a city, before enacting [a
zoning ordinance regulating SOBs],
to conduct new studies or produce
evidence independent of that
already generated by other cities, so
long as whatever evidence the city
relies upon is reasonably believed to
be relevant to the problem that the
city addresses. 31
Fifteen years passed before the Court addressed the
Secondary Effects Doctrine again. In 2002, the Court heard City
of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 32 a case involving another
city zoning ordinance on SOBs. In Alameda Books, the
respondents—adult bookstores—sought injunctive relief against
26
Id. at 70–71 (“[T]he State may legitimately use the content of these materials as the
basis for placing them in a different classification from other motion pictures.”).
27
475 U.S. 41 (1986).
28
Id. at 43 (upholding an ordinance prohibited “adult motion picture theaters from
locating within 1,000 feet of any residential zone, single- or multiple-family dwelling,
church, park, or school”).
29
Id. at 48 (quoting Va. Pharmacy Bd. v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748, 771 (1976)).
30
Id.
31
Id. at 51–52.
32
535 U.S. 425 (2002).
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a Los Angeles municipal ordinance that prohibited SOBs within
1,000 feet of other SOBs and within 500 feet of any school, public
park, or religious institution. 33 The Court held that a local or state
government cannot rely on “shoddy data or reasoning” to
support its ordinances and that “evidence must fairly support the
municipality’s rationale for its ordinance.” 34 However, the Court
ruled in favor of the city, stating that because the city based its
ordinance off of a previous study that linked the presence of
SOBs with “higher rates of prostitution, robbery, assaults, and
thefts in surrounding communities,” it had presented substantive
evidence to support the law. 35
Since Alameda Books, there has not been another Supreme
Court case to impact the application of the Secondary Effects
Doctrine. However, the doctrine has been the subject of much
debate among legal scholars. In the following section is a review
of the notable critiques of the doctrine.
III. LITERATURE REVIEW
An Overview of the Criticisms of the Secondary Effects Doctrine
Scholarly criticisms of the Secondary Effects Doctrine
range from frustrations about a lack of a clear definition of
“secondary effects” to outcry that the doctrine could undermine
the First Amendment. In his assessment, John Fee criticizes the
Court for not providing a clear or consistent distinction between
primary effects and secondary effects. 36 In an effort to find the
distinction between these two types of effects, and provide
practitioners with a clear definition of secondary effects, Fee
determined that four possible definitions of “secondary effects”
emerge from the Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence, none
of which fully encompasses all the ways the Court has applied
the doctrine. 37 Fee, in turn, argues that the Court likely utilizes
different conceptions of “secondary effects” to fit contextual
factors of a case: “[p]erhaps the term secondary effect is
convenient only because it is capable of more than one meaning

33

Id. at 430.
Id. at 438 (plurality opinion).
35
Id. at 430. “The city of Los Angeles may reasonably rely on a study it conducted
some years before enacting the present version of § 12.70(C) to demonstrate that its
ban on multiple-use adult establishments serves its interest in reducing crime.” Id.
The Court referenced Renton, noting that in that case it “specifically refused to set
such a high bar for municipalities that want to address merely the secondary effects
of protected speech. We held that a municipality may rely on any evidence that is
‘reasonably believed to be relevant’ for demonstrating a connection between speech
and a substantial, independent government interest.” Id. at 438.
36
John Fee, The Pornographic Secondary Effects Doctrine, 60 ALA. L. REV. 291 (2009).
37
Id. at 306.
34
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while appearing to be objective, and can therefore easily mask a
subjective balancing process.” 38
Other scholars take issue with the classification of the
Secondary Effects Doctrine as content-neutral. 39 Generally, the
argument against content-neutral classifications of this nature
stems from concern that they create a legal loophole for
lawmakers to target certain types of speech with impunity, which
causes confusion for the courts. 40 Also, it is difficult to determine
which secondary effects are so severe that they warrant
regulation. For example, previous cases have deemed visual
clutter, traffic congestion, noise, loss of a profession’s integrity,
and sexual arousal of readers as problematic secondary effects. 41
Deeming these types of secondary effects as problematic, and
therefore subject to regulation, is worrisome; regulation of these
“lesser” effects could lead to a slippery slope where regulation
may result in greater loss of speech protection. Moreover, the
Secondary Effects Doctrine can easily limit commercial and
political speech. 42 Regulations aimed at secondary effects have
also impeded political and commercial speech, 43 such as the
South Carolina city ordinance that prohibited the creation a
public mural due to presumed secondary effects that would harm
the city’s authenticity, property values, and tourism; 44 an Indiana
town ordinance that prevented a reporter from using a tape
38

Id. at 316.
For example, David Hudson blames the Secondary Effects Doctrine, and the
Renton decision particularly, for “wreak[ing] havoc in First Amendment
jurisprudence[,]” while Ofer Raban argues that the Secondary Effects Doctrine
“obliterates the content-based doctrine.” David L. Hudson, Jr., The Secondary-Effects
Doctrine: Stripping Away First Amendment Freedoms, 23 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 19, 19
(2012); Ofer Raban, Content-Based, Secondary Effects, and Expressive Conduct: What in the
World Do They Mean (and What Do They Mean to the United States Supreme Court)?, 30
SETON HALL L. REV. 551, 553 (2000).
40
See Hudson, Jr., supra note 39; Raban supra note 39; David L. Hudson, Jr., The
Secondary Effects Doctrine: "The Evisceration of First Amendment Freedoms", 37
WASHBURN L.J. 55 (1997).
41
David L. Hudson, Jr., The Secondary Effects Doctrine: "The Evisceration of First
Amendment Freedoms", 37 WASHBURN L.J. 55, 77–78 (1997) (“Some of the secondary
effects include: increased criminal activity, prostitution, residential privacy, visual
clutter, interference with ingress and egress, traffic congestion, noise, security
problems, appearances of impropriety, employment discrimination, economic
vitality in business districts, property values, preserving the educational appearance
of a college dormitory, preventing blockbusting, loss of a profession’s integrity,
identifying unfit judges, maintaining public order, equal employment opportunities,
street crime associated with panhandling, negative effects of gambling, competition
in the video programming market, congestion at the polls and confusion for election
officials tabulating votes, delay and interference with voters, sexual arousal of
readers, signal bleed and harm to children.”).
42
See id. at 84–85; see also Brandon K. Lemley, Effectuating Censorship: Civic
Republicanism and the Secondary Effects Doctrine, 35 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 189 (2002).
43
Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 69 (1976).
44
Burke v. City of Charleston, 893 F. Supp. 589, 613–14 (D.S.C. 1995), vacated, 139
F.3d 401 (4th Cir. 1998).
39
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recorder while attending a KKK march due to the secondary
effect concern that march attendees could injure themselves
when holding “personal items” at such events; 45 and a Rhode
Island anti-picketing ordinance that silenced anti-abortion
protesters in an effort to curtail the secondary effects of traffic
interference and risk of privacy violations. 46 Overall, the current
consensus among scholars is that that the Secondary Effects
Doctrine improperly allows state and local legislatures to stretch
current First Amendment protections thin for certain forms of
speech and expression, putting the freedom of expression at risk.
The Validity of Secondary Effects Research on Sexually Oriented
Businesses
The literature that explores the validity of the research
presented in secondary effects and SOB cases is divided into two
types. The first type of research explores whether the asserted
secondary effects from SOBs actually exist. The second type
investigates whether an assessment of the research presented by
the government establishes that it is scientifically credible.
Governments typically opt to regulate SOBs based on the
suggestion that such businesses are associated with increased
crime and decreased property value. 47 This notion has been the
subject of scholarly scrutiny. For example, in an empirical
examination of the relationship between adult erotic dance clubs
and the potential secondary effect of increased crime rates,
researchers found that, when comparing a community with an
erotic dance club against three communities that did not, the
community that had the erotic dance club had the least amount
of reported crime. 48 Similarly, in an assessment of a Texas city
ordinance that contends “human display establishments”
produce crime, researchers determined that SOBs were not to
blame for the community crime. 49 Rather, alcohol-related
establishments and the community demographic characteristics
(such as income level, age range, and race/ethnicity) were to
blame. 50 Taken together, these findings call into question the
45

Potts v. City of Lafayette, 121 F.3d 1106, 1112 (7th Cir. 1997).
Town of Barrington v. Blake, 568 A.2d 1015, 1020 (R.I. 1990).
47
Young, 427 U.S. at 69.
48
Daniel Linz et al., An Examination of the Assumption That Adult Businesses Are
Associated with Crime in Surrounding Areas: A Secondary Effects Study in Charlotte, North
Carolina, 38 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 69 (2004).
49
Roger Enriquez et al., A Legal and Empirical Perspective on Crime and Adult
Establishments: A Secondary Effects Study in San Antonio, Texas, 15 AM. U. J. GENDER
SOC. POL’Y & L. 1, 34 (2006).
50
Id. (“In short, the empirical evidence tempers the San Antonio City Council’s
contention that the presence of human display establishments produces crime.
Instead, the results point to weak institutions, namely alcohol outlets and community
characteristics associated with social disorganization theory as causes and correlates
of crime.”).
46
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quality and validity of the research supplied by the government
in secondary effects cases.
Assessments of the research quality and validity applied
in secondary effects case law found that, with few exceptions,
most of the studies used by municipalities “do not adhere to
professional standards of scientific inquiry and nearly all fail to
meet the basic assumptions necessary to calculate an error
rate.” 51 Moreover, the assessments determined that scientifically
credible studies demonstrated that either (1) there was no
“negative secondary effect associated with adult businesses,” or
(2) there was “a reversal of the presumed negative effect.” 52 But
governments are not the only parties guilty of providing poor
science: scholars found that “studies” used by SOBs to refute
secondary effects regulations were also flawed. 53 Nonetheless,
there is substantial evidence to demonstrate that not only is the
research used by local and state governments scientifically
flawed, but scientifically credible research has not been used to
rebut alleged secondary effects.
In sum, this research suggests that local and state
governments’ research on SOBs and their alleged negative
secondary effects are typically flawed. However, this research
focuses only on crime, property value loss, and overall
community degradation as the purported secondary effects.
There is no published research that assesses the validity of
negative secondary effects on public health stemming from
SOBs. This study seeks to answer the following research
questions:
(1) What health claims do local and state
governments make against SOBs?
(2) What is the substantiating evidence for these
health claims?
(3) What do these findings suggest about the
Secondary Effects Doctrine and the relationship
between speech and health?

51

Bryant Paul, Daniel Linz, & Bradley Shafer, Government Regulation of "Adult"
Businesses Through Zoning and Anti-Nudity Ordinances: Debunking the Legal Myth of
Negative Secondary Effects, 6 COMM. L. & POL’Y 355, 367 (2001).
52
Id.
53
Alan C. Weinstein & Richard McCleary, The Association of Adult Businesses with
Secondary Effects: Legal Doctrine, Social Theory, and Empirical Evidence, 29 CARDOZO
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 565, 586 (2011) (“The problem is that these claims either ignore
theoretically relevant characteristics of adult businesses or are methodologically
flawed. In particular, such claims ignore the routine activity theory of crime
associated with adult businesses or use inappropriate data sources and methods to
demonstrate that adult businesses are not associated with secondary effects or
both.”).
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IV. METHODOLOGY
To date, there are over 500 state and federal cases in
which a SOB has challenged regulations aimed at secondary
effects. Only twenty of these cases involve regulations aimed at
protecting health. 54 Prior to this analysis, an initial review of the
studies was completed to classify the types of regulations
involved in the cases and to ensure the cases met the study’s
requirements. 55
The initial review yielded seventeen cases, which
presented three types of public health-driven secondary effect
regulations: zoning, licensing, and internal regulations. 56 Zoning
regulations refer to the locations and distance restrictions placed
on SOBs; for example, SOBs are only allowed in certain parts of
a community or must be outside a certain distance from other
businesses, schools, etc. Licensing regulations refer to the
requirements for adult business license acquisition and grounds
for a license suspension or revocation. Internal regulations refer
to policies restricting or limiting the practices and activities of an
adult business. For example, requirements that dancers may not
touch patrons, dancers cannot be nude, stages must be a certain
height . . . etc. In total, there were nineteen regulations present
in the seventeen cases: three licensing, five zoning, and eleven
internal. This information is applied in the analysis as a way to
categorize and elaborate on the findings. The table below shows

54

These twenty cases were identified through Westlaw’s search results for First
Amendment and secondary effect regulations concerning “health,” “public health,”
“disease,” or “infection.” There is a chance that there are cases missing from this
analysis due to the limitations of the search results. However, the initial
identification of twenty cases is sufficient for the analysis.
55
The initial review determined three cases to be ineligible for analysis because they
did not concern public health-driven secondary effect regulations. Instead, these
cases simply referenced public health-driven secondary effect regulations, which
likely explains why they were included in Westlaw’s results.
56
City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277 (2000); McDoogal’s East, Inc. v. Cty.
Comm’rs of Caroline Cty., 341 F. App’x. 918 (4th Cir. 2009); Dream Palace v. Cty.
of Maricopa, 384 F.3d 990 (9th Cir. 2003); Currence v. City of Cincinnati, 28 F.
App’x. 438 (6th Cir. 2002); E. Brooks Books, Inc. v. City of Memphis, 48 F.3d 220
(6th Cir. 1995); T.K.’s Video, Inc. v. Denton Cty., 24 F.3d 705 (5th Cir. 1994);
Keepers, Inc. v. City of Milford, 944 F. Supp. 2d 129 (D. Conn. 2013); Entm’t
Prods., Inc. v. Shelby Cty., 545 F. Supp. 2d 734 (W.D. Tenn. 2008); Annex Books,
Inc. v. City of Indianapolis, 333 F. Supp. 2d 773 (S.D. Ind. 2004); Centerfolds, Inc.
v. Town of Berlin, 352 F. Supp. 2d 183 (D. Conn. 2004); Bigg Wolf Disc. Video
Movie Sales, Inc. v. Montgomery Cty., 256 F. Supp. 2d 385 (D. Md. 2003); Ranch
House, Inc. v. Amerson, 146 F.Supp.2d 1180 (N.D. Ala. 2001); DiMa Corp. v. The
Town of Hallie, 60 F. Supp. 2d 918 (W.D. Wis. 1998), aff’d, 185 F.3d 823 (7th Cir.
1999); U.S. Partners Fin. Corp. v. Kansas City, 707 F. Supp. 1090 (W.D. Mo. 1989);
DiMa Corp. v. City of St. Cloud, 562 N.W.2d 312 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997); Ocello v.
Koster, 354 S.W.3d 187 (Mo. 2011) (en banc); Golden Triangle News, Inc. v.
Corbett, 700 A.2d 1056 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1997), aff’d sub nom. Golden Triangle
News, Inc. v. Fisher, 717 A.2d 1023 (Pa. 1998).
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the citations for the seventeen cases analyzed and the type of
regulation involved in the case.
Table 1: Regulation type present in each case
Case
Annex Books, Inc. v. City of
Indianapolis, 333 F. Supp. 2d
773 (2004)
Bigg Wolf Discount Video
Movie Sales, Inc. v.
Montgomery County,
Maryland, 256 F. Supp. 2d
385 (2003)
Centerfolds, Inc. v. Town of
Berlin, 352 F. Supp. 2d 183
(2004)
Currence v. City of Cincinnati,
28 Fed. App’x. 438 (2002)
City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M.,
529 U.S. 277 (2000)
DiMa Corp. v. City of St.
Cloud, 562 N.W.2d 312
(1997)
DiMa Corp. v. The Town of
Hallie, Wi., 60 F. Supp. 2d
918 (1998)
Dream Palace v. County of
Maricopa, 384 F.3d 990
(2003)
East Brooks Books, Inc. v.
City of Memphis, 48 F.3d 220
(1995)
Entertainment Productions,
Inc. v. Shelby County, 545 F.
Supp. 2d 734 (2008)
Golden Triangle News, Inc. v.
Corbett, 700 A.2d 1056 (1997)
Keepers, Inc. v. City of
Milford, Conn., 944 F. Supp.
2d 129 (2013)
McDoogal’s East, Inc. v.
County Com’rs of Caroline
County, 341 Fed. App’x. 918
(2009)
Ocello v. Koster, 354 S.W.3d
187 (2011) (en banc)
Ranch House, Inc. v.
Amerson, 146 F. Supp. 2d
1180 (2001)
T.K.’s Video, Inc. v. Denton
Cty., 24 F.3d 705 (5th Cir.
1994)

Internal
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Licensing
X

X

X

X
X
X
X
X
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V. ANALYSIS
The Health Claims
The first task of this study was to identify the health
claims against SOBs. The analysis identified three types of health
claims typically presented by local governments to justify their
regulations: (1) preventing the spreading of disease (specifically,
STDs), (2) concern for increased danger or harm to health, and
(3) the need to protect, promote, and preserve the health of
business patrons and the local citizens.
The most commonly cited health claim—the secondary
effect—was that adult businesses are associated with the spread
of disease. 57 Thirteen cases indicated that diseases, sexual or
otherwise, stem from the adult businesses, and cited such
diseases as the basis for government regulation. 58 Of these
thirteen cases, all but one case 59 explained that the regulation in
question was established to address STDs, in particular,
HIV/AIDs. 60 Moreover, eight of the thirteen cases asserting this
claim specifically stated that regulation would prevent the
spreading of STDs that result from the sexual activity that occurs
at adult businesses. 61 The remaining four cases also reported that
57
Thirteen of the seventeen cases analyzed cited spread or risk of disease as the main
factor in enacting regulation. The cases were City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S.
277 (2000); McDoogal’s East, Inc. v. Cty. Comm’rs of Caroline Cty., 341 F. App’x.
918 (4th Cir. 2009); Dream Palace v. Cty. of Maricopa, 384 F.3d 990 (9th Cir. 2003);
Currence v. City of Cincinnati, 28 F. App’x. 438 (6th Cir. 2002); T.K.’s Video, Inc.
v. Denton Cty., 24 F.3d 705 (5th Cir. 1994); Keepers, Inc. v. City of Milford, 944 F.
Supp. 2d 129 (D. Conn. 2013); Entm’t Prods., Inc. v. Shelby Cty., 545 F. Supp. 2d
734 (W.D. Tenn. 2008); Annex Books, Inc. v. City of Indianapolis, 333 F. Supp. 2d
773 (S.D. Ind. 2004); Centerfolds, Inc. v. Town of Berlin, 352 F. Supp. 2d 183 (M.D.
Fla. 2004); DiMa Corp. v. The Town of Hallie, 60 F. Supp. 2d 918 (W.D. Wis.
1998), aff’d, 185 F.3d 823 (7th Cir. 1999); DiMa Corp. v. City of St. Cloud, 562
N.W.2d 312 (Minn. Ct. App., 1997); Ocello v. Koster, 354 S.W.3d 187 (Mo. 2011)
(en banc); Golden Triangle News, Inc. v. Corbett, 700 A.2d 1056 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1997), aff’d sub nom. Golden Triangle News, Inc. v. Fisher, 717 A.2d 1023 (Pa. 1998).
58
Id.
59
Keepers, Inc., 944 F. Supp. 2d at 129.
60
Dream Palace, 384 F.3d at 1014 (“Specifically, those secondary effects include
prostitution, drug abuse, health risks associated with HIV/AIDS, and infiltration and
proliferation of organized crime for the purpose of drug and sex related business
activities.”).
61
In T.K.’s Video, Inc., the court stated that “sexually oriented business are
frequently used for unlawful sexual activities, including prostitution and sexual
liaisons of a casual nature.” T.K.’s Video, Inc. v. Denton Cty., 830 F. Supp. 335,
340 (E.D. Tex. 1993), aff’d in part, vacated in part, T.K.’s Video, Inc. v. Denton Cty.,
24 F.3d 705 (5th Cir. 1994). Other cases that cited this include City of Erie v. Pap’s
A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 290 (2000); Dream Palace v. Cty. of Maricopa, 384 F.3d 990,
996 (9th Cir. 2004); Currence v. City of Cincinnati, 28 F. App’x 438, 446 (6th Cir.
2002); DiMa Corp. v. City of St. Cloud, 562 N.W.2d 312, 321 (1997); Ocello v.
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the secondary effects regulations targeted the spread of STDs,
but these cases did not explain or identify a source for STDs. 62
This is to say that, unlike the eight cases that justified enaction
of regulations as a response to the spread of STDs stemming
from sexual activity occurring at adult businesses, these four
cases did not provide an explanation for how STDs were
spreading in the community in question.
The other two types of health claims cited by
governments referred to broad and generalized health concerns.
For example, in five cases 63 the government did not cite a specific
health concern but instead stated that adult businesses generally
pose “greater danger to neighborhood health,” 64 threaten
“impact on the public health,” 65 or lead to “increased unhealthful
conduct.” 66 Similarly, in nine cases, 67 the government argued
that the objective of the regulation was “to protect and preserve
the health, safety, and welfare of both the patrons of adultoriented establishments and the citizens” 68 of the community
Koster, 354 S.W.3d 187 (Mo. 2011) (en banc); Annex Books, Inc. v. City of
Indianapolis, 333 F. Supp. 2d 773 (S.D. Ind. 2004); Golden Triangle News, Inc. v.
Corbett, 700 A.2d 1056, 1063–64 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1997), aff’d sub nom. Golden
Triangle News, Inc. v. Fisher, 717 A.2d 1023 (Pa. 1998).
62
McDoogal’s East, Inc. v. Cty. Comm’rs of Caroline Cty., 341 F. App’x. 918 (4th
Cir. 2009); Entm’t Prods., Inc. v. Shelby Cty., 545 F. Supp. 2d 734 (W.D. Tenn.
2008); Centerfolds, Inc. v. Town of Berlin, 352 F. Supp. 2d 183 (M.D. Fla. 2004);
DiMa Corp. v. The Town of Hallie, 60 F. Supp. 2d 918 (W.D. Wis. 1998), aff’d, 185
F.3d 823 (7th Cir. 1999).
63
City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 280 (2000); Dream Palace v. Cty. of
Maricopa, 384 F.3d 990, 1014 (9th Cir. 2004); Currence v. City of Cincinnati, 28 F.
App’x 438, 446 (6th Cir. 2002); Entm’t Prods., Inc. v. Shelby Cty., 545 F. Supp. 2d
734 (W.D. Tenn. 2008), aff’d, 588 F.3d 372 (6th Cir. 2009); U.S. Partners Fin. Corp.
v. Kansas City, 707 F. Supp. 1090, 1095 (W.D. Mo. 1989).
64
City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 291 (2000).
65
Currence v. City of Cincinnati, 28 F. App’x 438, 446 (6th Cir. 2002).
66
Keepers, Inc. v. City of Milford, 944 F. Supp. 2d 129 (D. Conn. 2013), aff’d in part,
vacated in part, remanded, 807 F.3d 24 (2nd Cir. 2015); Dream Palace v. Cty. of
Maricopa, 384 F.3d 990 (9th Cir. 2004); Centerfolds, Inc. v. Town of Berlin, 352 F.
Supp. 2d 183 (D. Conn. 2004); Ocello v. Koster, 354 S.W.3d 187 (Mo. 2011) (en
banc). See E. Brooks Books, Inc. v. City of Memphis, 48 F.3d 220 (6th Cir. 1995);
Annex Books, Inc. v. City of Indianapolis, 333 F. Supp. 2d 773 (S.D. Ind. 2004),
aff’d in part, and remanded in part, 581 F.3d 460 (7th Cir. 2009); Bigg Wolf Disc. Video
Movie Sales, Inc. v. Montgomery Cty., 256 F. Supp. 2d 385 (D. Md. 2003); Golden
Triangle News, Inc. v. Corbett, 700 A.2d 1056 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1997), aff’d sub nom.
Golden Triangle News, Inc. v. Fisher, 717 A.2d 1023 (Pa. 1998).
67
Dream Palace v. Cty. of Maricopa, 384 F.3d 990 (9th Cir. 2003); E. Brooks Books,
Inc. v. City of Memphis, 48 F.3d 220 (6th Cir. 1995); Keepers, Inc. v. City of
Milford, 944 F. Supp. 2d 129 (D. Conn. 2013); Annex Books, Inc. v. City of
Indianapolis, 333 F. Supp. 2d 773 (S.D. Ind. 2004); Centerfolds, Inc. v. Town of
Berlin, 352 F. Supp. 2d 183 (D. Conn. 2004); Bigg Wolf Disc. Video Movie Sales,
Inc. v. Montgomery Cty., 256 F. Supp. 2d 385 (D. Md. 2003); Ranch House, Inc. v.
Amerson, 146 F. Supp. 2d 1180 (N.D. Ala. 2001); Ocello v. Koster, 354 S.W.3d 187
(Mo. 2011) (en banc); Golden Triangle News, Inc. v. Corbett, 700 A.2d 1056 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1997), aff’d sub nom. Golden Triangle News, Inc. v. Fisher, 717 A.2d
1023 (Pa. 1998).
68
Golden Triangle News, 700 A.2d at 1063.
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that surrounded the SOBs. As a whole, these cases assert claims
that are arguably vague and unlimited, especially when
compared to the specific health claims about the spread of
disease. 69
To further explicate these findings, the health claims were
analyzed in accordance with regulation type. Below is a table of
the three types of regulation and the health claims identified
within those regulations.
Table 2: Health claims cited by regulation type
Risk of
Disease

Endanger or
Threaten
Health

Need to
Protect
Health

Zoning
Bigg Wolf Discount Video Movie Sales, Inc. v.
Montgomery County, Maryland, 256 F. Supp. 2d 385
(2003)a
DiMa Corp. v. City of St. Cloud, 562 N.W.2d 312
(1997)
McDoogal’s East, Inc. v. County Com’rs of Caroline
County, 341 Fed. Appx. 918 (2009)
Ranch House, Inc. v. Amerson, 146 F. Supp. 2d 1180
(2001)b
U.S. Partners Financial Corp. v. Kansas City, Mo., 707
F. Supp. 1090 (1989)

X
X
X
X
X

Licensing
Annex Books, Inc. v. City of Indianapolis, 333 F. Supp.
2d 773 (2004)
East Brooks Books, Inc. v. City of Memphis, 48 F.3d
220 (1995)
T.K.’s Video, Inc. v. Denton Cty., 24 F.3d 705 (5th
Cir.1994)

X

X
X

X

Internal
Bigg Wolf Discount Video Movie Sales, Inc. v.
Montgomery County, Maryland, 256 F. Supp. 2d 385
(2003)a
Centerfolds, Inc. v. Town of Berlin, 352 F. Supp. 2d 183
(2004)
Currence v. City of Cincinnati, 28 Fed. Appx. 438
(2002)

X
X

X

X

X

City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277 (2000)

X

X

DiMa Corp. v. The Town of Hallie, Wi., 60 F. Supp. 2d
918 (1998)

X

69

E.g., Keepers, Inc., 944 F. Supp. 2d at 129.
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Dream Palace v. County of Maricopa, 384 F.3d 990
(2003)
Entertainment Productions, Inc. v. Shelby County, 545
F. Supp. 2d 734 (2008)
Golden Triangle News, Inc. v. Corbett, 700 A.2d 1056
(1997)
Keepers, Inc. v. City of Milford, Conn., 944 F. Supp. 2d
129 (2013)
Ocello v. Koster, 354 S.W.3d 187 (Mo. 2011) (en banc)
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X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

Ranch House, Inc. v. Amerson, 146 F. Supp. 2d 1180
(2001)b

Superscripts a and b mark the two cases (with their pairs) that included
more than one type of regulation.
Several conclusions may be drawn from Table 2. The
table reflects all seventeen cases cited at least one type of health
claim. Interestingly, the most health claims emerged in cases
involving internal regulations, which tended to cite multiple
health claims. Table 2 also shows the different types of health
claims are distributed across the types of regulations. For
example, none of the cases involving licensing regulations
claimed that SOBs posed a threat to or endangered health.
Conversely, zoning and internal regulations presented all three
types of health claims in at least one case.
Collectively, this analysis concludes that each case and
regulation type cite at least one type of secondary health effect of
SOBs. In many cases, the claims are broad and unexplained, but,
unfortunately, specificity is not required of secondary effect
regulation. This lack of specificity might explain why local and
state governments implementing the same type of regulation cite
different types of health claims to support regulation. On the
other hand, it is possible that citing different health claims to
support the same type of regulation is the result of different
evidence substantiating the regulations. Therefore, the following
analysis is based on the evidence used by local and state
governments to substantiate their health claims against and
regulations on SOBs.
The Substantiating Evidence
The Secondary Effects Doctrine requires that a secondary
effect regulation must serve a substantial government interest. To
demonstrate that substantial interest, the burden rests on the
local or state government to present evidence that demonstrates
the SOB in question not only causes or is associated with the
alleged secondary effects, but that the proposed regulation is a

X
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reasonable measure that will reduce those particular effects. 70
Therefore, subsequent to identifying the health claims in these
cases, this analysis identified the evidence used by governments
to substantiate their health claims.
Upon analysis, however, only six cases contained
substantiating evidence claims. 71 In each of the seventeen cases,
there was at least one mention of the government in question
“examining” or “reviewing” evidence of secondary effects and
SOBs, but almost two-thirds of the case law made no mention of
substantiating evidence. Further, it is possible that within the
case filings evidence is present to substantiate the health claims.
However, only six case opinions mention evidence that spoke to
substantiate the alleged health claims. As a result, the following
discussion concerns only those six cases that contained evidence
to substantiate the secondary effect health claims.
The analysis identified three types of evidence used to
substantiate the secondary effect health claims: (1) secondary
effects studies conducted by other municipalities, (2) secondary
effects studies conducted by the municipality in question, and (3)
testimony from health officials. The most commonly cited
evidence by governments was studies conducted by other
municipalities. In five of the six cases, the defending government
stated that secondary effects health claims stemmed, either in
part or entirely, from research conducted by other cities that
identified connections between sexually oriented businesses and
adverse health effects. 72 However, none of the opinions reported
any statistical findings from the research. This is to say, when the
courts cited research findings that pointed to SOBs causing
adverse health effects, there were never any inclusions of
70

Annex Books, Inc. v. City of Indianapolis, 581 F.3d 460, 464 (7th Cir. 2009)
(citing City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, 535 U.S. 425, 438 (2002)). The
plurality opinion in Alameda Books reasserted the Renton standard, under which a
municipality may rely on any evidence that is “reasonably believed to be relevant”
for demonstrating a connection between speech and a substantial, independent
government interest. Alameda Books, 535 U.S. at 438 (quoting City of Renton v.
Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 51–52 (1986)).
71
Annex Books, Inc. v. City of Indianapolis, 581 F.3d 460, 463 (7th Cir. 2009);
Entm’t Prods., Inc. v. Shelby Cty., 545 F. Supp. 2d 734 (W.D. Tenn. 2008), aff’d,
Entm’t Prods., Inc. v. Shelby Cty., 588 F.3d 372, 383 (6th Cir. 2009); Centerfolds,
Inc. v. Town of Berlin, 352 F. Supp. 2d 183, 191 (D. Conn. 2004); DiMa Corp. v.
City of St. Cloud, 562 N.W.2d 312, 320 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997); Ocello v. Koster,
354 S.W.3d 187, 203 (Mo. 2011) (en banc); Golden Triangle News, Inc. v. Corbett,
700 A.2d 1056 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1997), aff’d sub nom. Golden Triangle News, Inc. v.
Fisher, 717 A.2d 1023 (Pa. 1998).
72
DiMa Corp. v. City of St. Cloud, 562 N.W.2d 312 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997); Annex
Books, Inc. v. City of Indianapolis, 581 F.3d 460 (7th Cir. 2009); Entm’t Prods., Inc.
v. Shelby Cty., 545 F. Supp. 2d 734 (W.D. Tenn. 2008), aff’d, Entm’t Prods., Inc. v.
Shelby Cty., 588 F.3d 372 (6th Cir. 2009); Centerfolds, Inc. v. Town of Berlin, 352 F.
Supp. 2d 183 (D. Conn. 2004); Golden Triangle News, Inc. v. Corbett, 700 A.2d
1056 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1997), aff’d sub nom. Golden Triangle News, Inc. v. Fisher,
717 A.2d 1023 (Pa. 1998).
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numeric or statistical data—only broad and generalized
statements. This phenomenon further demonstrates the lack of
government substantiation for its public health-based regulations
of SOBs.
The lack of reported statistical data is also prevalent in
cases where the government utilized other types of substantiating
evidence, such as studies conducted by the municipality in
question and testimony from health officials. Only one case,
Entertainment Productions, Inc. v. Shelby County, 73 presented a
scenario where the government relied on research conducted by
the city itself:
Upon review of the record, the
Shelby County ordinance adopting
the Act cites numerous studies on
the effects of adult entertainment in
Memphis and Shelby County . . .
The ordinance further relies upon
the Tennessee legislative findings
that the Act sought to “address
some
recognized
deleterious
secondary
effects
commonly
associated with adult-oriented
establishments, including but not
limited to an increase in crime, the
spread of sexually transmitted
diseases, the downgrading of
property values, and other public
health, safety, and welfare issues. 74
Similarly, Ocello v. Koster 75 was the only case where the
government cited testimony from its own local health officials to
further substantiate its health claims: “[t]he government also
relied on testimony from health department officials in Missouri
describing the health problems associated with sexually oriented
businesses. Among other issues, the officials discussed that
people infected with [STDs], including HIV, frequent [SOBs],
and often engage in anonymous and unprotected sex.” 76 Still,
just like the cases that cited studies conducted by other
municipalities, neither of these opinions report any statistical
findings to substantiate the health claims against the SOBs.

73

545 F. Supp. 2d 734 (W.D. Tenn. 2008).
Id. at 742.
75
Ocello v. Koster, 354 S.W.3d 187 (Mo. 2011) (en banc).
76
Id. at 206.
74

2019]

231

IMBALANCE BETWEEN SPEECH & HEALTH

To continue the analysis, the evidence was next analyzed
in accordance with regulation type. Below is a table of the three
types of regulations and the evidence identified within those
regulations.
Table 3: Evidence cited by regulation type
Studies by
other cities

Studies by the
city in
question

Testimony
from health
officials

Zoning
DiMa Corp. v. City of St. Cloud, 562 N.W.2d 312
(1997)

X

Licensing
Annex Books, Inc. v. City of Indianapolis, 333 F. Supp.
2d 773 (2004)

X

Internal
Centerfolds, Inc. v. Town of Berlin, 352 F. Supp. 2d 183
(2004)
Entertainment Productions, Inc. v. Shelby County, 545
F. Supp. 2d 734 (2008)
Golden Triangle News, Inc. v. Corbett, 700 A.2d 1056
(1997)

X
X

X

X

Ocello v. Koster, 354 S.W.3d 187 (Mo. 2011) (en banc)

Table 3 reflects the finding that six cases cited at least one
type of substantiating evidence. Interestingly, for each type of
regulation, the defending governments relied on other
municipalities’ studies. Granted, this analysis reviewed only one
zoning regulation and one licensing regulation. Nonetheless,
these findings show the proliferation of other municipalities’
research in local and state government secondary effects
regulation. Additionally, the table shows that one case,
Entertainment Productions, Inc. v. Shelby County, utilized two types
of evidence: studies by other municipalities and studies
conducted by the municipality in question. 77 Finally, Table 3
shows different types of evidence reside entirely in the internal
regulations; all three types of evidence (studies by other
municipalities, the municipality in question, and testimony by
health officials) are prevalent only in the internal regulations,
while only studies for other municipalities emerge in zoning and
licensing regulations.
77

See Entm’t Prods., Inc. v. Shelby Cty., 545 F. Supp. 2d 734, 742 (W.D. Tenn.
2008), aff’d, Entm’t Prods., Inc. v. Shelby Cty., 588 F.3d 372 (6th Cir. 2009).

X
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Coupled with the health claim findings, the data reveals
a pattern of vagueness in these cases measuring the validity of
public health-driven secondary effects regulations. Regarding the
health claim findings, the defending governments typically do
not supply specifics on the health claims they make against
SOBs. 78 Moreover, when the courts discuss the substantiating
evidence provided by the governments, either no health-specific
evidence is reported, or the evidence reported is vague and lacks
statistical support. Together, these findings suggest that there are
serious problems with the Secondary Effects Doctrine based on
the threshold for evidence required. Further, the identification of
the health claims and substantiating evidence within these
seventeen cases affords a larger discussion on these public healthdriven secondary effect regulations and their impact on the
balance between protecting health and protecting speech.
The Imbalance between Speech & Health
Based on the cases studied, it is evident that courts do not
require defending governments to present specific, scientifically
supported evidence to support their claims against SOBs. This is
apparent in the nine cases that consisted of broad and unspecified
claims about the need to “protect and promote” 79 the health of
business patrons and local citizens. Likewise, the five cases that
contained all-encompassing claims alleging SOBs pose “greater
danger to neighborhood health” 80 and threaten “impact[s] on the
public health.” 81 Moreover, none of the opinions provide
instruction to the defending governments on how to specify their
claims or present evidence to support their claims. Instead, in
each case the courts held that the government in question was
well within its legislative power to create and enforce ordinances
that address secondary health effects, regardless of breadth or
ambiguity of the government’s characterization of those effects.
78

See City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 291 (2000). See also supra Part V.A.
Dream Palace v. Cty. of Maricopa, 384 F.3d 990 (9th Cir. 2003); E. Brooks Books,
Inc. v. City of Memphis, 48 F.3d 220 (6th Cir. 1995); Keepers, Inc. v. City of
Milford, 944 F. Supp. 2d 129 (D. Conn. 2013); Annex Books, Inc. v. City of
Indianapolis, 333 F. Supp. 2d 773 (S.D. Ind. 2004); Centerfolds, Inc. v. Town of
Berlin, 352 F. Supp. 2d 183 (D. Conn. 2004); Bigg Wolf Disc. Video Movie Sales,
Inc. v. Montgomery Cty., 256 F. Supp. 2d 385 (D. Md. 2003); Ranch House, Inc. v.
Amerson, 146 F. Supp. 2d 1180 (N.D. Ala. 2001); Ocello v. Koster, 354 S.W.3d 187
(Mo. 2011) (en banc); Golden Triangle News, Inc. v. Corbett, 700 A.2d 1056 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1997), aff’d sub nom. Golden Triangle News, Inc. v. Fisher, 717 A.2d
1023 (Pa. 1998).
80
City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 280 (2000); Dream Palace v. Cty. of
Maricopa, 384 F.3d 990, 1014 (9th Cir. 2004); Currence v. City of Cincinnati, 28 F.
App’x 438, 446 (6th Cir. 2002); Entm’t Prods., Inc. v. Shelby Cty., 545 F. Supp. 2d
734 (W.D. Tenn. 2008), aff’d, 588 F.3d 372 (6th Cir, 2009); U.S. Partners Fin. Corp.
v. Kansas City, Mo., 707 F. Supp. 1090, 1095 (W.D. Mo. 1989).
81
City of Erie, 529 U.S. at 291.
79
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This freedom to assert broad and vague health claims in
an attempt to regulate certain forms of expression poses a great
risk to speech, sexual or otherwise. While it is within the power
of local and state governments to enact measures that protect
public health, the existing case law demonstrates that there is
only limited restraint on lawmakers to regulate this area,
allowing them to paint with broad strokes about health effects
that stem from certain types of speech and expression, and even
disfavor certain forms of expression without providing reliable
support. In short, for scholars who criticize the secondary effects
doctrine, this analysis shows their worst fears are true. This
precedent opens the door to a slippery slope, which could present
a scenario where local and state governments can lawfully
regulate any speech so long as the regulations concern protecting
health or curbing “increased unhealthful conduct.” 82 At the very
least, this precedent exposes SOBs to unsubstantiated
overregulation. These threats undermine First Amendment
freedoms and demonstrate a need for change in the current
application of the Secondary Effects Doctrine.
One solution is for courts to require a higher standard of
support when adjudicating public health-driven secondary effect
regulations. Courts should not accept vague and/or overly broad
claims alleging harm to public health when reviewing local or
state regulation of SOBs or other businesses. Rather, courts
should require local and state governments to explicate specific,
scientifically sound evidence to justify regulations aimed at
curbing public health-driven secondary effects. By adopting a
more rigorous standard to support such public health-driven
claims, local and state governments must clear a higher hurdle to
limit the speech and expression of SOBs and similar businesses.
In adopting a more stringent standard, courts will require
stronger justifications, and stronger contentions, from the
governments that the regulations presented truly target harmful
effects, solidifying that such regulations are indeed contentneutral. Adopting this standard will protect speech of SOBs and
other sexual or adult speech as well as improve the current
analysis of secondary effects overall. Additionally, this places
accountability on our local and state governments to only enact
regulation where there are true, identified health claims—not
simply target speech the state may find mature or suggestive.
In regard to substantiating these claims and regulations,
precedent requires that local and state governments merely
provide evidence that shows the regulations are reasonable and
will reduce the identified secondary effects. 83 However, our
82
83

Hudson, Jr., supra note 41 at 77–78.
See Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc. 427 U.S. 50, 55 (1976).
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analysis found that even so, only six cases reported evidence to
support the regulations. The lack of reported evidence, statistical
or otherwise, means that in practice it is not necessary for
governments to provide specific evidence to substantiate their
claims against SOBs or to substantiate that the regulations in
question curb their health claims. This makes existing matters
worse considering that the threshold for evidence required by the
Secondary Effects Doctrine is already low. Existing precedent
holds that governments are not allowed to rely on “shoddy data
or reasoning,” 84 but, ironically, the Court has explained it is not
the courts’ job to assess the validity of the substantiating
evidence. 85
Hence, there is a great contradiction in this matter: courts
require evidence for the claim, but evidence is not used to
determine the regulation’s validity. Coupled together, the low
threshold of evidence and the contradiction between evidence
requirement and evidence assessment turns the Secondary
Effects Doctrine into a mere checklist of requirements, not a fair
balancing test. This rubberstamping has created a body of cases
that favor the protection of health over the protection of speech,
and that have very little scientific or other support. When dealing
with controversial speech, such as SOBs, it presents a dangerous
loophole that lawmakers have capitalized on to censor or limit
speech they find troublesome or unfavorable.
A Solution
Therefore, remedies to close this content-based loophole
in the Secondary Effects Doctrine are needed to ensure a fair test
and to establish a balance between speech and health. This
balance can be achieved through specified and supported health
claims and by raising the standard for the quality and type of
evidence required to substantiate such claims in court. The
natural path to achieve this goal would be through legislative or
judicial action. However it is approached, the threshold should
require local and state governments to supply evidence for each
of its claims and evidence that shows the regulation will further
the cited interests. Specifically, when such regulations are
challenged in court, defending governments should be required
to supply jurisdiction-specific and data-driven evidence. To
ensure the threshold of evidence is met, courts must resolve the
conflict with evidence presence and evidence assessment.
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Although the role of the court is to be a rational voice
interpreting the law that is not contingent on science or data, in
cases involving speech regulation for the purposes of protecting
public health, it is crucial for the courts to consider the validity
of the evidence presented. Recent case law involving content
regulations on speech, such as mandated graphic warning labels
on tobacco products, show that courts may assess the quality and
conclusions of the evidence supplied by defending
governments. 86 This practice of evidence assessment should be
carried over to secondary effect regulations. Collectively,
through a requirement that local and state governments provide
specific health claims, raising the threshold of evidence to
support public health-driven secondary effects regulation, and
resolving the contradiction between evidence presence and
evidence assessment will provide a fair test for assessing public
health-drive secondary effect regulations.
VI. CONCLUSION
At their core, public health-driven regulations implicate a
challenging conflict between speech and health. On the one
hand, efforts are made by local and state governments to protect
the public’s health from the negative effects that stem from SOBs.
On the other hand, constitutionally protected freedoms of speech
and expression for controversial business, like SOBs, are
threatened. It has been recognized in the First Amendment
jurisprudence that sexual speech—and thus SOBs—are accorded
less protection. 87 However, lesser protection does not equate to a
total loss of protection. Lawmakers should not be able to target
SOBs or other such businesses under the guise of content-neutral
regulations where their claims are unsubstantiated.
Our case analysis shows that local and state governments
are free to manipulate the Secondary Effects Doctrine through
regulations drafted with broad strokes about the health claims
they make against SOBs, and without having to support those
claims with evidence. This freedom has been afforded to them
through the Secondary Effects Doctrine, but at the cost of certain
speech protections. The low threshold for evidence and the
courts’ inactivity in assessing the supplied evidence’s validity
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leaves SOBs and the freedom of speech ripe for unsubstantiated
overregulation. But these risks can be remedied by requiring
specific health claims, raising the threshold of evidence, and
resolving the contradiction between evidence presence and
evidence assessment. If such steps are taken, this particular
loophole in the Secondary Effects Doctrine may be remedied and
a balance will be struck between protecting health and protecting
speech. Otherwise, the Secondary Effects Doctrine creates a
slippery slope for First Amendment protections to slip away—
not just for SOBs, but for everyone.

